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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case underlying this appeal is an action by Respondent Dave Dorion (hereinafter
"Dorion"), against Appellant Rick Keane and various entities (hereinafter collectively, "Keane"),
for breach of contract and declaratory relief. (Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, R. Vol. I, pp.
12-21). The parties entered ajoint venture to construct a triplex airplane hangar at the LewistonNez Perce County Airport, sell two units, and share the third unit. (Id. at 13-16). On the brink of
completion, however, Keane excluded Dorion from the premises, and refused to pay the amount
agreed upon to Dorion for labor expended in construction. In February of 2009, Dorion filed his
Complaint. (Id.)
After Keane failed to appear, Dorion applied for and ultimately obtained a default on March
27, 2009. (Motion for Entry of Default, and Non-Military Affidavit, Affidavit for Default,
Application for Default and Default, R. Vol. I, pp. 22-26).

Keane eventually sought, and was

granted relief; the first default was set aside on May 21,2009. (Opinion and Order on Defendants'
Motion to Set Aside Default, R. Vol. I, pp. 37-43). Almost immediately, and while fully aware that
a claim existed relative to the third hangar unit, Keane attempted to sell that third unit; Dorion was
required to seek, and was granted relief via a Temporary Restraining Order, prohibiting Keane from
doing so, on October 15, 2009. (Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, R. Vol. I, pp. 49-50, First
and Second Affidavits of Dave Dorion, R. Vol I, pp. 51-56, Affidavit of Robin Turner, 57-60,
Affidavit of Joy Smith, R. Vol. I, pp. 61-63, Affidavit of Eldon Howard, R. Vol. I, pp. 64-67.
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, R. Vol. I, pp. 68-76).
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The district court vacated a May, 2010 trial setting, and on the eve of a scheduling
conference
for a new trial date, Mr. Miles, Keane's counsel, requested to withdraw, based upon a breakdown
in the attorney client relationship, which motion was granted on August 5, 2010. (Motion to
Withdraw, R. Vol. I, pp. 81-83, Affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw, R. Vol. I, pp. 84-85,)
Despite being served with the Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw, Keane once again failed to
appear by the deadline set in the order. (Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw, Proof of Service Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw Served by Certified Mail 8-9-10, Register of Actions, R. Vol.
I, p. 6).
The district court entered a second default against Keane on September 8, 2010. (Entry of
Default, Register of Actions, R. Vol. I, p. 6). On September 17,2010, Keane filed a Second Rule
60(b) Motion, seeking to set aside the default. (Motion to Set Aside Default, Register of Actions,

R. Vol. I, p. 6). Following briefing, hearing and oral argument, Keane's motion was denied, and
default judgment was entered on December 29, 2010. (See Generally, Register of Actions, R. Vol.
I, pp. 7-8; Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and Plaintiffs Motion
for Entry of Judgment, R. Vol. I, pp. 86-92, Judgment, R. Vol. I, pp. 93-95).
At hearing on Keane's Second Rule 60(b) Motion, oral argument focused solely on the
issues of 1) whether a misunderstanding had occurred between counsel with respect to a time period
within which Keane's counsel must appear; and 2) whether Keane had a meritorious defense.
Keane's counsel raised no issue or question regarding the validity of the or timeliness of the Second
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Default at this hearing. (Transcript of Proceedings, Motion Hearing November 18, 2010, R. Vol.
I of I).
Keane filed the present appeal on February 4,2011, and an Amended Notice of Appeal on
March I, 2011. (Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. I, pp. 96-99; Amended Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. I, pp.
100-103). Keane also filed a Third Rule 60(b) Motion on March 21, 2011, which the district court
denied on April 11, 2011. (Order Denying Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Final
Judgment, R. Vol. I, 108-109).
A.

Procedural History and Time Line

For the Court's convenience, significant procedural facts are highlighted as follows.
DATE

DESCRIPTION

February 24, 2009

Dorion files Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

March 27, 2009

District Court enters First Default against Keane

May 21,2009

District Dourt grants Keane's First Rule 60(b} Motion

September 1, 2010

Dorion files Second Motion for Entry of Default. The record reflects
that the Motion for Entry of Default was filed with the Court on
September 1, 2010, at 4:33 p.m. (i.e. 27 minutes prior to the close of
business that day).

September 8, 2010

District Court enters Second Default against Keane.

September 17, 2010

Keane files a Second Rule 60(b) Motion, styled a Motion to Set Aside
Default, also filed pursuant to Rule 55( c), entered on September 8,
2010.

October 14, 2010

Dorion files a Motion for Entry of Judgment

December 29,2010

District Court grants Dorion's Motion for Default Judgment and
denies Keane's Second Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside Default.
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January 14,2011

Judgment entered against Keane.

February 4,2011

Keane files Notice of Anneal to the Idaho State Supreme Court.

March 1,2011

Keane files an Amended Notice of Appeal.

March 21, 2011

Keane files a Third Rule 60(b) Motion, styled Motion for Relief from
Final Judgment.

April 11,2011

District Court denies Keane's Third Rule 60(b) Motion.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Whether the district court erred in denying
the Keane's Rule 60 (b) Motion because, as
tl

a matter of law, the default judgment was void.
B. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the Keane's Motion to Set
Aside Default.
C. Whether Keane is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
D.

Whether Dorion is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
III. ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review
A motion to set aside a default or judgment by default is addressed
to the discretion of the trial court. Marco Distributing, Inc. v.
Biehl, 97 Idaho 853, 856,555 P.2d 393, 396 (1976). A district
court's refusal to set aside a default judgment will not be disturbed
on appeal, absent an abuse of that discretion. Idaho ex reI. Russell
v. Real Prop. Situated in the County o/Cassia, 144 Idaho 60,62,
156 P.3d 561,563 (2007). In determining whether the district court
abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court:
(l) correctly understood the issue to be one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer bounds of its discretion; and (3) reached its
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decision on the motion before it through the exercise ofreason.ld.
The legal standard for a motion to set aside a default or default
judgment under I.R.c.P. 55(c) is either "for good cause shown" or
the grounds found in I.R.C.P. 60(b), which allows default
judgment to be set aside for, among other things, mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Id.

Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 552,224 P.3d 1138,1141 (2010). Keane has appealed the entry of
default, the default judgment, and both the Second and Third Rule 60 Motions. Keane's Second
Rule 60(b) Motion relied upon Subsection (1) mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, as well
as Rule 55(c), which requires set aside upon a showing of good cause. (Opinion and Order on
Defendant's Second Motion to Set Aside Default R. Vol. I p. 89).
Keane's Third Rule 60 Motion relied upon an argument that the default and default judgment
entered in this matter is void. Grounds "such as the voidness ofajudgment under subsection (b)(4),
create a nondiscretionary entitlement to relief." Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 59, 704
P.2d 960, 963 (Ct. App. 1985). "Where discretionary grounds are invoked, the standard of review
is abuse of discretion. Where nondiscretionary grounds are asserted, the question presented is one
of law upon which the appellate court exercises free review." Id.
B. The district court's Second Entry of Default was a proper exercise of discretion.

As stated, the decision to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default is within the discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a finding of an abuse of the court's discretion.
Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho at 552, 224 P.3d at 1141. A trial court acts within its discretion if(1) the
court correctly understands the issue to be one of discretion; (2) the court acts within the outer
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bounds of its discretion; and (3) the court reaches its decision on the motion through the exercise
of reason. Id. The district court properly recognized the Second Rule 60 Motion as calling for an
exercise of discretion, and properly applied the legal standard of good cause, found in Rule 55( c),
in its determination not to set aside the Second Entry of Default.

(Opinion and Order on

Defendant's Second Motion to Set Aside Default R. Vol. I, pp. 86-91).

This standard, however,

does not apply to the Third Rule 60 Motion, which was filed after entry of default judgment. See
McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931, 935, 854 P.2d 274 (CLApp. 1993).

In determining whether

a party makes a showing sufficient to set aside entry of default, the district court, in exercising its
discretion, must consider three factors. "The primary considerations are whether the default was
willful, whether setting aside the default would prejudice the opponent, and whether a meritorious
defense has been presented." McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho at 936, 854 P.2d at 279 (CL App.
1993) citing Traguth v. Zuck. 710 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.1983), quoting Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274,

276 (2d Cir.1981).

1. Keane has failed to show a meritorious defense.
In order to meet the requirement of showing good cause for setting aside default, a litigant
is required to show that he had a meritorious defense.
"This requirement is imposed because "[i]t would be an idle exercise
for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real justiciable
controversy." Jd. Consequently, where no meritorious defense is
shown in support of a motion to set aside a default, a court does not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion."
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Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 553,224 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2010), citing Idaho ex reI. Russell v. Real
Prop. Situated in the County of Cassia, 144 Idaho 60, 62, 156 P.3d 561,563 (2007); Hearst Corp.
v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 12, 592 P.2d 66, 68 (1979).

"[A] party seeking to set aside a default

judgment must show a meritorious defense going beyond the mere notice requirements which would
be sufficient ifpleaded before default." Herzinger v. Lockwood Corp., 109 Idaho 18,20,704 P.2d
350, 352 (Ct. App. 1985), citing Reeves v. Wisenor, 102 Idaho 271, 629 P.2d 667 (1981); Hearst
Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10,592 P.2d 66 (1979).
"[P]arties moving to set aside the entry of default must also allege
facts which would constitute a defense to the action. This conclusion
is supported by the application of this rule in other jurisdictions as
well. See DeHoney v. Hernandez, 122 Ariz. 367, 595 P.2d 159 (1979);
Cribb v. Matlock Communications, Inc., 236 Mont. 27, 768 P.2d 337
(1989); Sealed Unit Parts Co. v. Alpha Gamma Chapter, 99 Nev. 641,
668 P.2d 288 (1983); 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil2d § 2697 (1983)."

McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931,934,854 P.2d 274,277 (Ct. App. 1993) Keane's support for
his affirmative defenses appear to be limited to sparsely worded pleadings in his Answer, and a very
short Affidavit, which references his alleged confusion about representation, but provides no factual
detail or support to shore up his affirmative defenses. (Answer, R. Vol I, pp 44-47; Affidavit of
Richard Keane, R. Vol I pp. 30-31). Keane has not ventured beyond mere notice pleading
requirements in order to show a meritorious defense, and did not, at the time of moving to set aside
entry of default, allege additional facts constituting a meritorious defense.

It should be born in mind that the district court had considerable opportunity to review
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Dorion's factually rich and detailed affidavits from a number of witnesses in this case, upon
Dorion's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (See Affidavits, R. Vol I, pp 49-67). It is also
noteworthy that the district court gave fair warning after Keane's first default, and pointed out that
Keane's affidavit "was weak at best in presenting a meritorious defense" in its findings upon both
Keane's first and second motions to set aside default. (Opinion and Order on Motion to Set Aside
Default, R. Vol I, p 42, Opinion and Order on Defendant's Second Motion to Set Aside Default, R.
Vol. I p. 90). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Keane had
failed to show a meritorious defense.
2. Keane failed to show good cause for setting aside entry of default, because the failure
to appear was willful and caused prejudice to Dorion.

The district court found in its Opinion and Order, entered on December 29,2010, that
Keane had failed to show good cause for setting aside default. (Opinion and Order on Second
Motion to Set Aside Default, R. Vol. I, p. 90). The district court concluded that Keane's actions
demonstrated a pattern of failing to timely appear, and asserting through new counsel, a fictitious
and incredible agreement for an equally fictitious and indefinite extension of time for the new
counsel to appear. While the district court did not use the word "willful" in the opinion, this
characterization is easily inferred from the Opinion, which points out that Keane "has chosen instead
to neglect the lawsuit," and engaged in this conduct not once, but twice, in the same case. Id. Based
upon his factual findings, the district court concluded that Keane failed to show good cause to set
aside the Second Entry of Default. Id.
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In addition, the district court recognized prejudice to Dorion in the form of time and money
spent litigating this case with no disposition, resulting from Keane's neglect to timely appear and
defend. The district court stated, " The lawsuit has been pending for nearly two years, during which
time, Plaintiff has made every effort to prosecute the matter, while Defendant has failed to take the
matter seriously and has chosen instead to neglect the lawsuit, addressing it only after defaults have
been entered." Id. In sum, the district court properly found that Keane failed to present a
meritorious defense, and engaged in willful conduct that caused prejudice to Dorion. The district
court committed no abuse of discretion, and the Entry of Default and Default Judgment should be
upheld on appeal.

C.

The district court's Second Entry of Default and Default Judgment does not violate

Rule 11(b)(3). I.R.C.P .• is not void under Rule 60(b), and should not be set aside.
Keane attempts to characterize Dorion's filing of a Motion for Default as a proceeding
violation ofLR.C.P. 11(b)(3). This rule provides in pertinent part, as follows:
Upon the entry of an order granting leave to an attorney to withdraw
from an action, no further proceedings can be had in that action
which will affect the rights of the party of the withdrawing attorney
for a period of 20 days after service or mailing of the order of
withdrawal to the party. If such party fails to file and serve an
additional written appearance in the action either in person or through
a newly appointed attorney within such 20 day period, such failure
shall be sufficient ground for entry of default and default judgment
against such party or dismissal of the action of such party, with
prejudice, without further notice, which shall be stated in the order of
the court. The attorney shall provide the last known address of the
client in any notice of withdrawal.
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1. The entry of default was timely.
Keane correctly points out that he is provided twenty (20) days to appear, following
withdrawal of his fonner attorney. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5) Keane also correctly notes that Rule
6(e), LR.C.P., provides an additional three (3) days to appear, to allow for mailing and service of
the II(b)(3) Order. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7). The Order was served upon Keane on August 9, 2010,
and twenty three days later, on September 1, 2010, Dorion filed his motion for entry of default, at
the close of business. Default was not entered until September 8, 2010, thirty (30) days after service
of the Order upon Keane. Thereafter, Keane did not actually enter an appearance until September
17,2010.
Keane has argued that a motion is a proceeding, within the meaning of Rule 11, I.R.C.P ..
However, the filing of a motion is not a proceeding which affects the rights of a party. The granting
of the motion is a proceeding which affects the rights of a party, but not the filing of the motion
itself. A party's rights are not affected until the COUli acts on the motion in a manner that prejudices
or gives relief to a party.

In this matter, the Court entered Default on September 8, 2010.

September 8, 2010 was the date that a proceeding occurred which affected the rights of the
Defendant; that date clearl y satisfies the requirements of! .R.C.P. 11 (b )(3). the Entry of Default, and
the Default Judgment, later entered by this Court on January 14, 2011, is neither void not voidable,
on the basis of timeliness. Keane's Rule 60(b) Motion is misplaced.
Furthennore, it must be emphasized that Keane has provided no authority to support this
assertion. The Idaho Court of Appeals case Blanc v. Laritz. cited by Keane, offers no support to this
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proposition. (Appellant's Brief at 10-12); 119 Idaho 359, 806 P.2d 452 (Ct.App.1991). In Laritz,
meaningful proceedings occurred prior to the expiration of the twenty-three day period, but the
meaningful proceeding was one that actually had an outcome and an effect upon the litigant in
question: entry of default. That case actually stands for the Plaintiff's position: that the Entry of
Default, and not the filing of the motion itself, is the proceeding that must comply with the
requirements of I.R.c.P. 11 (b)(3). See Id. at 362, 806 P.2d 452 ("Thus, since twenty-three days
should have elapsed before Laritz's default was entered, the Order of October 21 is voidable under
I.R.C.P.60(b)(4)"). (Emphasis provided.).
2. The Court's second Entry of Default strictly complied with Rule 11(b)(3).
Keane points out in his Third Rule 60(b) Motion and his briefing, that strict compliance with
Rule II(b)(3) is required before a valid judgment may be entered against him. (Appellant's Brief
at 12) Keane also argues that because the II(b)(3) Order, drafted by Keane's attorney, Mr. Miles,
did not include the following language, "or dismissal of the action of such party [Keane] with
prejudice," that the Order did not comply with the requirements ofthe Rule. (Appellant's Brief at
11-12).
When Keane, the defendant in the underlying case, filed his Answer, he alleged the
existence of certain affirmative defenses, but raised no counterclaims. Therefore, when his attorney
withdrew, Keane was at no risk of seeing any counterclaims dismissed (with or without prejudice),
because he did not have any.

However, on appeal, he complains that he was not warned of a

procedural consequence that he was at no risk of suffering, and which would have affected only
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rights and claims which he did not have, and has not claimed.
Mr. Miles' drafting ofthe Order, which did not warn Keane of a procedural event that would
never happen (dismissal) to rights or interests that Keane neither owned nor alleged (counterclaims
in this action), did not impugn or negate the Order's strict compliance with Rule 11(b)(3). Upon his
withdrawal, Mr. Miles gave notice to Keane of all possible consequences to Keane that might occur
in this specific matter, should Keane fail to timely appear, such as entry of default and default
judgment. Mr. Miles thus rendered strict compliance with Rule 11 (b)(3).
The 11 (b)(3) Order also demonstrates a careful crafting or tailoring of the Order, to the
particular circumstances and parties in this case. The Supreme Court has recognized in dicta that
such tailoring of the language in Rule II(b)(3) Order is prudent and necessary. Reinwald v.
Eveland, cited by Keane, points out that the language in the Rule is not the litmus test, but the
tailoring of the language in the order to the specific circumstances of the client - and case- subject
to the order:
"This case demonstrates difficulties that may be encountered by the
failure to craft or to tailor to the particular circumstances of a case or
ofthe parties an order permitting the withdrawal of an attorney where
a default judgment is subsequently sought."
119 Idaho 111, 113,803 P.2d 1017,1019 (Ct. App. 1991). Rather than blindly follow form
language, Mr. Miles "crafted or tailored to the particular circumstances" of this case, and these
parties, " an order permitting the withdrawal of an attorney where a default judgment [was]
subsequently sought." To hold otherwise is to exalt both form - and form language - over substance.
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The 11 (b)(3) Order in this case is very similar to the order found by the Idaho Supreme Court
to "fully [conform] with the requirements of LR.C.P. II(b)(3)" in Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v.
Riplinger 103 Idaho 535, 538, 650 P.2d 677,680 (1982). That Order read as follows:
"NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that ROBERT H.
THOMPSON is granted leave to withdraw as attorney for the
defendant(s) and shall send by certified mail a copy of this order
directing the Defendant(s) to appoint another attorney to appear, or
to appear in person by filing a written notice with the court stating
how they will represent themselves within twenty (20) days from the
date of this order. Such failure to appear in the action within twenty
(20) days shall be sufficient grounds for entry of default against the
defendant(s) without further notice to the defendant(s)."
Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 543, 650 P.2d 677, 685 (1982). The
language in the Rule 11 (b )(3) Order, similarly complies with the Rule. The omission of the form
language that Keane proposes should have been included, could be viewed as a red herring; it does
not, and could not apply to him in this case, given the procedural status. This omission could also
be viewed as a successful "crafting or tailoring" of the specific language in this order, to the specific
facts, procedure and law as it presents in this case. Mr. Miles omitted language that simply did not
apply to, and would not affect or prejUdice Keane. The order, as drafted, strictly complies with Rule
II(b)(3), and also complies with the admonition of the Supreme Court to carefully craft and tailor
just such an order.
The cases cited by Keane, which are analyzed in some detail, infra, are representative of
cases where Rule 11 (b)(3) orders failed to warn affected litigants of the very procedural
consequence which they eventually suffered. In these cases, the Court found that such orders failed
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to strictly comply with the Rule. As discussed, the authorities which Keane relies upon are very
distinguishable from the present mater, in both fact and law.
Keane cites to Blanc v. Laritz, for the proposition that the district court failed to comply
with Rule II(b)(3), and that the default judgment is void pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). (Appellant's
Brief at 10-13); Blanc v. Laritz, 119 Idaho 359,806 P.2d 452 (1991).

In Laritz, however, two

errors resulted in default being set aside. First, the 11 (b )(3) order served upon appellants failed to
state that failure to timely appear would result in both a default, and a default judgment. Id. at 360362,453-455. The exact result that the 11 (b)(3) notice failed to include - the possibility of a default
judgment- occurred in Lartiz. Second, as stated, supra, the default itself was entered before the 23
day period expired, following service upon the appellant. Id. By contrast, Keane did receive notice
of the result imposed against him:

a default judgment. Also by contrast, no proceedings that

actually affected Keane's rights occurred for seven days after the expiration of the twenty-three (23)
day period, on September 8, 2010.
Keane also cites to Berg v. Kendall, in support of his argument that strict compliance with
Rule 11 (b)(3) is required to obtain a valid judgment, but that issue was not actually addressed in this
case. this case. See Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,577,212 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2009); (Appellant's
Brief at 5). In Berg, appellants did not receive timely notice of the hearing on their attorney's
motion to withdraw, pursuant to Rule 11 (b), LR.C.P. 147 Idaho 571,577,212 P.3d 1001,1007
(2009). However, appellants failed to show that inadequate notice was the cause of their claimed
prejudice, pursuant to Rule 61, LR.C.P. Id. This Rule "requires that the court, at every stage of the
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proceeding 'must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties'." In Laritz, the Court found the requirements of 11 (b )(3) to have
been strictly complied with, and thus did not reach the question of whether Rule 61 should be
applied to arguments made under Rule II(b)(3). Id. at 577-578,1007-1008.
Knight Ins. v. Knight, also cited by Keane in support of timeliness and strict compliance
arguments, is also not factually similar to the present matter. (Appellant's Briefat 10); Knight Ins.,
Inc. v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 704 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1985).

In Knight, the appellants became

confused by two different orders issued relative to their attorney's withdrawal pursuant to Rule
II(b)(3). Id. at 58,962. One order provided for twenty days to appear, pursuant to Rule II(b)(3),
and another order provided for the appellants to assert their malpractice claim in the same action
against their attorney within forty days. Id. Furthermore, the 11 (b )(3) order was never reduced to
writing or served upon the appellants. Id. Only the order providing for the appellants to assert their
malpractice claim within forty days was reduced to writing and served upon appellants. Id. The
district judge, who apparently believed that the appellants had adequate notice of the twenty day
requirement to enter an appearance based solely upon his oral instructions in open court, was
overturned on appeal. Id. at 59-60, 963-964.
Keane also relies upon Reinwald v. Eveland in support of his strict compliance argument.
(Appellant's Brief at 12); Reinwald v. Eveland, 119 Idaho 111, 803 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1991).
In Reinwald, the 11 (b )(3) order at issue failed to set out the steps that the appellant needed to take
in order to protect herself from a default judgment. Id. at 113,109. The order in question did not
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specifY that the appellant must file an appearance on her own, or through an attorney, nor did it
disclose the possibility of a judgment by default without further notice.

Id.

The Court further

found the language contained within the order to be ambiguous. The appellant failed to appear, and
the exact result that the 11 (b )(3) order failed to give notice of - a default judgment- occurred. Id.
Similarly Keane relies upon Martinez v. Brown, in support of his strict compliance argument.
(Appellant's Briefat 12); Martinez v. Brown, 144 Idaho 410, 412,162 P.3d 789, 791 (Ct.App.2007).
In Martinez, the 11 (b)(3) order failed to give notice to appellant that his claim might be dismissed
with prejudice, should he fail to timely appear. The exact result that the II(b)(3) notice failed to
give - a dismissal with prejudice - occurred in Martinez. Id. at 411-412,790-791.

Unlike the

defendants in Reinwald and Martinez, Keane received, in his II(b)(3) Order, advance notice of the
result that was actually imposed upon him, a default judgment.
In sum, the Order in this case was carefully tailored to the specific circumstances and status
of the party in question, Mr. Keane. The Order thus did not give notice to Keane of procedural
consequences which posed no danger to him. The Order in this case is not analogous to the raft of
cases cited by Keane, in which the orders failed to give notice of procedural consequences, that the
affected litigants ultimately suffered. Rather, the Order is exemplary of what this Court in dicta, has
warned counsel to do: consider the facts and circumstances in the case, rather than adhere blindly
to form language, and accordingly draft a well-tailored order. Keane was well served by his counsel
when the 11 (b)(3) Order was drafted and served upon him. He is in no position to complain of it
now.
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D. The wording of the Withdrawal Order caused no prejudice to Keane, and complied with
Rule 11(b)(3) and Rule 61, I.R.C.P.

As stated, supra, the 11 (b)(3) order, drafted by Keane's attorney, strictly complied with the
applicable requirements of the Rule, and is neither voidable, nor void. In addition, the form
language in the Rule that was not included in this particular order relates to procedures, procedural
consequences and facts that simply do not exist in this case, because they relate to the dismissal of
counterclaims, and Keane raised no counterclaims.
Therefore, should the Court find that the 11 (b )(3) Order somehow failed to comply with the
Rule, the unanswered question of the applicability of Rule 61, LR.C.P., in Berg v. Kendall, supra,
may properly be addressed here. 147 Idaho at 577, 212 P.3d at 1007.

Considering that the Order

in question omits language from the rule that relates to facts, law and procedure not in existence, at
issue or even relevant in this case, it is safe to say that Keane has failed to show "any error or defect
in the proceeding, which has affected the substantial rights of the parties," per the requirements of
Rule 61, LR.C.P. In essence, the 11(b)(3) Order's language affected Keane's rights in no way, and
caused absolutely no prejudice to him.
E. Keane's filing of the Third Rule 60(b) Motion was filed seven months after the Entry of
Default, and was untimely.

Keane's Third Rule 60(b) Motion was untimely. It appears that Keane untimely filed the
Third Rule 60(b) motion, in an attempt to raise legal arguments he neglected to timely raise in the
Second Rule 60(b) Motion, within a reasonable time, or within six months following entry of
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default. Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part, as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than six (6)
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. Such motion does not require
leave from the Supreme Court, or the district court, as the case may
be, as though the judgment has been affirmed or settled upon appeal
to that court."
Keane waited more than seven months after the Second Entry of Default and over two
months after the entry of Default Judgment, to file his Third Rule 60(b) motion. After Keane filed
the Second Rule 60(b) Motion, the parties submitted briefing, supporting affidavits and oral
argument. The Court took the matter under advisement, and issued its Opinion and Order on
December 29, 2010, denying the Motion. Keane could have raised the issues contained within the
Third Rule 60(b) Motion in his Second Rule 60(b) Motion, and simply failed to do so, and then
failed to do so within a reasonable time following entry of default and default judgment.
What constitutes a reasonable time depends upon the facts in each
individual case. See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
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MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 2866, at 382 (1995) (discussing the
corresponding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure). It must appear that
"the defaulting party is not guilty of indifference or unreasonable
delay" and has acted "promptly and diligently in seeking relief."
Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117, 121,247 P.2d 469, 471 (1952). See
also Clark v. Atwood, 112 Idaho 115, 117, 730 P.2d 1035, 1037
(Ct.App.1986). The six-month period specified in Rule 60(b) is the
outermost limit, and a motion may be rejected as untimely if not made
within a "reasonable time" even though the six-month period has not
elapsed. 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 2866 at 389.

Viafax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 70-71, 995 P.2d 835,840-41 (Ct. App. 2000). Keane
has provided no credible explanation or excuse for the delayed filing of the Third Rule 60 Motion,
and has simply made not showing that the late filing was reasonable. Keane's Third Rule 60(b)
Motion, and the arguments raised therein, should not be considered on appeal, on the basis that they
were not timely raised.

F. Keane, by failing to timelv appear prior to entry of default, has abandoned his affirmative
defenses.
As discussed, Keane did not timely appear following receipt of service of the Withdrawal
Order.

In Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the

consequences offailing to timely appear following notice under Rule 11 (b )(3). That case provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
"n the present case, the defendant failed to file a written notice of
appearance or the appointment of new counsel within the prescribed
time limit. This failure to comply with LR.C.P. II(b)(3) justifies a
presumption that he abandoned his defense .... "
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"The presumption of abandonment raised by a defendant's failure to
proceed in an action in accordance with court rules may be rebutted
by any reasonable showing of inability to comply with those rules.
Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,210,78 S.Ct. 1087, 1094,2
L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958). However, in this case the defendant made no
showing of inability to comply with LR.C.P. 11 (b)(3). Thus, it was
within the district court's power to enter a default judgment against
the defendant for failure to proceed in accordance with LR. c.P. 11 (b)(3)."
Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 540, 650 P.2d 677,682 (1982). Keane did
not timely appear, as required by the Rulell (b )(3) Order. Therefore, a presumption has arisen, that
Keane abandoned his affirmative defenses. He did not rebut this presumption. Neither he, nor his
counsel made a credible showing of an inability to comply with the Rule in his Rule 60 Motions.
Keane thus failed at the district comi level, to meet his burden of proof on the Second and Third
Rule 60 Motions. For Keane to proceed without affirmative defenses is an idle exercise. On these
further grounds, his appeal should be denied.

G.

Keane is not entitled to Attorney's Fees on appeal.
Keane somewhat inexplicably argues that if he prevails on appeal, that he is entitled to

attorneys fees, pursuant to I.c. 12-120(3). In support of this position, Keane relies upon Meyers v.
Hansen, in which a plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendant, and the Idaho Supreme
Court determined on appeal that Plaintiff prevailed on his commercial claim, and ordered defendant
to pay attorneys. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 293, 221 P.3d 81,91 (2009). Keane's position
is opposite of the appellant in Meyers in the present matter. Even if Keane prevails on every aspect
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of his appeal, he has not prevailed on an underlying claim, and is thus not entitled to attorney's fees.
Keane's position in this matter is more analogous to Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing
Company, in which the Idaho Supreme Court reversed summary judgment rendered in favor of an
employer, but still found that the employee was not entitled to attorneys fees on appeal. 145 Idaho
408,415, 179 P.3d 1064 (2008). This Court noted that "Mackay is the prevailing party on appeal
but it remains to be seen whether he will be the prevailing party in the action, and, therefore, entitled
to attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3)." Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho at 415,
179 P.3d at 1071. This appeal revolves around setting aside a default judgment. In the event that
the default and default judgment is set aside, Keane would still be required to defend and litigate
against Plaintiff's claims on the merits, before any determination regarding prevailment may be
made with respect to the underlying transaction and claims. It "remains to be seen whether he will
be the prevailing party in the action," even ifhe prevails on every point in this appeal. Therefore,
Keane is not entitled to attorneys fees, and his request should be denied.

H. Dorion is entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal.
Dorion agrees, for purposes of this appeal, that the underlying suit relates to a commercial
transaction, and attorney fee awards are governed by Idaho Code 12-120(3).
"A 'commercial transaction' is defined as any transaction, except
transactions for personal household purposes." Cramer v. Slater, 146
Idaho 868, 881, 204 P.3d 508,521 (2009). This appeal arises from a
dispute over the parties' respective rights upon termination of a joint
venture, which falls under the definition of a "commercial
transaction. "
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Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, RV., 148 Idaho 89, 111,218 P.3d 1150, 1172 (2009). As discussed,
if Keane prevails on appeal, he would still be required to prevail on the underlying suit, before an
attorney fees award may be made. Conversely, should Dorion prevail on appeal, he will have
prevailed on the merits of the underlying suit without further showing or proceedings.
"Where an action is one to recover in a commercial transaction, that
claim triggers the application of section 12-120(3) and the prevailing
party may recover fees "regardless of the proof that the commercial
transaction did in fact occur." General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v.
Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 860, 979 P.2d 1207,1218 (1999).
Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 415,179 P.3d 1064,1071 (2008). Therefore,
Dorion is entitled to attorney's fees on both the appeal, and the underlying matter, pursuant to Rule
41, LA.R. and Idaho Code § 12-120(3), and respectfully requests an award of attorney's fees on
appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion, by denying Keane's Second and Third Rule
60(b) Motions. The district court reasonably concluded that Keane failed to show good cause for
setting aside default. In addition, Keane's Third Rule 60(b) Motion has no substantive basis under
Rule 60, and was untimely filed.
With respect to the substance of the Keane's argument, his contentions raised in the Third
Rule 60(b) Motion are without merit. Upon the withdrawal of Keane's counsel, Mr. Miles, he
strictly complied with the requirements of Rule 11 (b )(3). Furthermore, Keane suffered no prejudice
as a result of neither the timing of the entry of default, no any changes from the language of the
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Rule, in the 11(b)(3) Order, which was tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of the
underlying case.
Keane is not entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. If Keane prevails upon appeal, he has yet
to prevail on the underlying action, because he has neither obtained a default, nor defended against
the merits of Dorion's claims. Conversely, Dorion is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Dorion,
should he prevail on appeal, has also obtained a default and default judgment at the district court
level, and therefore has prevailed on the underlying, commercial claim.
This Court is respectfully requested to deny Keane's appeal, to deny Keane's
request for attorney's fees, and is further respectfully requested to grant Dorion's request for
attorney's fees.
DATED this 25 th day ofJanuary, 2012.
FEENEY, LLP
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